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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Humanitarian intervention is both a politically and emotionally charged topic. The decision 
to engage in combat is serious and when the fate of people suffering rests on that decision, it looms 
larger. Humanitarian intervention played an important role in history and the world today. Concern 
for the fellow man and the failure of the world to stop many humanitarian disasters in history has 
led to wars, international organizations, and international laws regarding human rights as well as a 
strong moral conscience. Humanitarian intervention is documented as far back as the 1820s when 
the British sent money, weapons, and men to support the Greeks against Ottoman atrocities.
1
 While 
military force has been used for political purposes under the guise of humanitarian intervention, the 
level of humanitarian intervention for the purpose of ending human rights abuses has increased as 
the world becomes more globalized and the plight of those suffering becomes increasingly public. 
The present norm of humanitarian intervention, "armed intervention when a state shows itself 
unable or unwilling to prevent grave human rights abuses," or humanitarian aid delivered under 
military protection, stems from the dangerous environment surrounding humanitarian disasters 
which requires military protection for humanitarian aid to be successfully delivered.
 2
  
 Intervention by the US for humanitarian purposes has been documented in Iraq to protect 
the Kurds, Somalia, and Bosnia, however, the case of Kosovo in 1999, was one of the quickest and 
strongest responses by the US (and the West as a whole) to a humanitarian crisis and therefore 
provides an interesting case study and example for humanitarian intervention in modern US 
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foreign policy. Increasing calls for and action based on humanitarian crises demonstrates a more 
international focus on human rights and the increasing obligations of foreign countries to act 
outside their borders not for the traditional purposes of war, to gain power, territory or for control 
of resources, but for the purpose of protecting the human race. After the intervention in Kosovo, 
the concept of humanitarian intervention was formalized by the United Nations (UN) in 2005 as 
the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) which designates a "commitment to protect populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity" in which the international 
community has not only the right but the responsibility to act using diplomatic or military 
measures when a state has failed to protect its citizens from human rights abuses.
3
 R2P as well as 
discussions surrounding current conflicts, such as that in Syria, show the continuing importance of 
understanding when, and under what conditions humanitarian intervention has been considered 
justified by US policymakers and the international community as a whole. 
 While many studies address the legality, the successfulness, or the morality of intervention, 
a direct look at the reasoning and justification for intervention given by policymakers has been 
overlooked in the wide range of literature on humanitarian intervention. Therefore, this thesis will 
address the reasons, from the perspective of US policymakers, behind the NATO military 
intervention in Kosovo in 1999. It will seek to explain the multiple reasons for intervention by 
touching on the ethical justification, national security concerns, and the role of international 
organizations such as NATO and the UN in spurring or hindering action. The purpose is to see 
why and under what circumstances US policymakers would choose to use their military to 
intervene in another countries affairs by analyzing policymaker's justifications for the 
intervention in the Kosovo conflict of 1999 as a case study. In general, this thesis will focus on 
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the policymaker's reasoning for intervening in Kosovo rather than the actions within the 
intervention itself given the purpose is not to determine the success of humanitarian intervention 
but rather when policymakers' consider it justified. 
 Two points must be noted in regards to this thesis. First, throughout this paper the two 
sides of the conflict are referred to as the Serbs and the Kosovars. Following the collapse of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992,  the republics of Serbia and Montenegro, 
including the province of Kosovo, formed a country entitled the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY). The name was not changed to the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro until 2003. This 
paper will sometimes refer to Serbia and sometimes to FRY. While no country existed by the 
name of Serbia in 1999, FRY and its government was dominated by Serbia and Serbian President 
Slobodan Milošević. Therefore, at times in this thesis the word "Serbia" is used to refer to the 
national government of  Milošević instead of FRY given that Montenegro had little effect on the 
situation in Kosovo. This point has been addressed in order to avoid confusion. Second, this 
study is limited by the availability of sources given its subject matter of government policy only 
fifteen years after the campaign. Therefore it relies heavily on public documents and speeches 
from the time, which tend to be written to optimize public approval and therefore may not 
convey the complete intentions of the government. Other sources include interviews conducted 
in 2013 by the author with policymakers from 1999 whose testimony has been affected by 
hindsight and/or memory issues regarding the subject. While these limitations can affect the 
reliability of many studies, since the purpose of this paper is to gauge policymaker's reasoning 
for intervention to the domestic public and the world, they are less of an issue, though as stated 
above, they still should be noted. 
 
6 
Background and Timeline of the Kosovo Conflict and Intervention 
 On March 24, 1999 NATO bombers flew into Serbia, part of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, beginning a 78 day long bombing campaign to assist in ending the conflict between 
the Serbs and Kosovar Albanians in the Balkans. However, the Serbs and Kosovar Albanians had 
had a long history of conflict prior to 1999. While there is some debate regarding when the 
Albanians arrived in the area, it is generally decided that they have been around since the early 
Middle Ages. When the Slavs entered the Balkans in the sixth century, the Albanians moved into 
the region now known as Kosovo. The Slavs followed and by 1190, Kosovo "had become the 
administrative and cultural center of the medieval Serbian state."
4
 It remained that way for the 
next 200 years and "still today Kosovo is known by Serbians as 'Old Serbia.'"
5
 Then in 1389 in 
the Battle of Kosovo, the Serbs were defeated by the Ottoman Turks and lost control of the 
region. By the 15th century, the Albanians had repopulated the region once more. This conflict 
continued off and on for the next 500 years.  
 After World War II, Kosovo was united with Serbia as part of Yugoslavia. In 1974 a new 
constitution was enacted which declared Kosovo an autonomous province of Yugoslavia. While 
it was not considered a republic like Serbia was, Kosovo was now one of the eight federal units 
that made up Yugoslavia and had the same legal standing within Yugoslavia as Serbia.
6
 This 
gave Kosovo both constitutional and legislative autonomy allowing the Kosovars to basically 
govern their own affairs.
7
 This new found freedom gave the Albanians in Kosovo "[f]rom 1974 
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until the late 1980's...the most administrative and cultural autonomy in their history."
8
 In the late 
1980s, Serbian nationalism grew, especially under the vocal leadership of Slobodan Milosevic 
who became President of Serbia in late 1987. Milosevic wanted to unify a "greater Serbia" which 
included the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina.  
 In 1987, Serbia first proposed to take away Kosovo's autonomy. This attempt failed 
because it was not in Serbia's powers to take away the rights of the autonomous province. In 
1989 the process began when a series of amendments to the Serbian constitution brought Kosovo 
under Serbia's direct control. This process was met with severe Albanian protests and strikes. 
Violence broke out on both sides.
9
 On July 5, 1990, Serbia dissolved the Albanian government of 
Kosovo and "following this, the Serbian police dissolved all the organs of local authority" in 
Kosovo.
10
  The abolition of Kosovo's autonomy resulted in the disbanding of the police force in 
Kosovo (to be replaced by Serbian policemen), removal of Albanian judges and prosecutors from 
courts, closed down schools taught in the Albanian language, ended Albanian language media, 
removed Albanian doctors and medical staff which destroyed health care in the country (also, 
fired Albanian workers no longer had a right to health care), and Serbian takeover of Albanian 
cultural institutions. In general, Serbian "imposed rule" on Kosovo destroyed the economy.
11
  
 When the conflict in Bosnia was ended with the Dayton Accords in 1995, many Kosovars 
hoped that their plight would gain some recognition by the international community given the 
similarities of their situation to that of the Bosnian Muslims. However, the Dayton Accords did 
not acknowledge the persecution of the Albanians in Kosovo by the Serbian government. 
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Following this rejection by the international community, many Kosovars increasingly turned to 
active opposition to the Serbian government and the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army), Kosovo's 
Albanian insurgency, grew in power.
12
 
 It is important to remember that while the government of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia was led by Serbians and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, in the province of 
Kosovo, only around 10% of the population was ethnically Serbian, while around 83% of the 
population was ethnically Albanian at this time.
13
  
 In 1997, the KLA conducted a series of attacks against the Serbs in Kosovo to destabilize 
the province which included the execution of Serbian police officers and Albanians suspected of 
collaborating with the Serbian police. In response to increasing KLA attacks, in 1998, the 
Serbians responded with increasingly violent attacks on villages in Kosovo, especially the 
Drenica region.
14
 The "Contact Group" consisting of representatives from the United States 
(US), United Kingdom (UK), Russia, France, Germany, and Italy (which had convened five 
years earlier to discuss the situation in Bosnia) begin meeting in March 1998 to discuss 
Kosovo.
15
 On March 31, 1998, the first UN Security Council Resolution was passed, number 
1160, condemning excessive Serbian use of force in Kosovo.
16
 The UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees continually noted the worsening human rights situation in Kosovo in June 1998. On 
                                                          
12
 Dejan Guzina, "Kosovo or Kosova-Could It Be Both? The Case of Interlocking Serbian and Albanian 
Nationalisms," Understanding the War in Kosovo, ed. Florian Bieber and Zidas Daskalovski (London: 
Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 41. 
13
 Helge Brunborg, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Report on the size and 
ethnic composition of the population of Kosovo," Last modified August 4, 2002. 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/OTP/War_Demographics/en/milosevic_kosovo_020814.pdf. 
14
 Guzina, pp. 41-42. 
15
 Public Broadcasting Service, "A Kosovo Chronology." 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/etc/cron.html. 
16
 United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1160 (1998)." March 31, 1998. 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1160(1998). 
9 
July 6, 1998, the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission was formed by the US, European Union 
(EU), and Russia to monitor the situation.  
 On September 23, 1998, UN Resolution 1199 reiterated Resolution 1160 and called for a 
ceasefire and for diplomatic negotiations to begin between the Serbs and Kosovars.
17
 
Immediately following Resolution 1199, NATO increased its level of military preparedness and 
said it will take action (air strikes) should Serbia not comply with the UN resolution.
18
 Milosevic 
agreed to comply in an agreement he made with US diplomat Richard Holbrooke, as well as in 
other agreements he made with NATO and the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe). Milosevic agreed to "cease hostilities and withdraw forces used in the 
repression of civilians in Kosovo; improve the humanitarian situation, permit free access for 
humanitarian organizations, and facilitate the return of refugees and displaced persons; enter into 
a meaningful dialogue on a political solution for Kosovo" and allow the Kosovo Verification 
Mission (KVM) organized by OSCE to ensure compliance.
19
 In response to these agreements, 
NATO called off its proposed airstrikes. 
 From October 1998 to January 1999, the KVM, led by US Ambassador William Walker, 
operated and observed several ceasefire violations, though none as severe as the Racak massacre 
in which Serb forces killed 45 unarmed Kosovar civilians in the village of Racak on January 15, 
1999. Overall, the West viewed the Racak massacre as a symbol of "Serbia's flagrant non-
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compliance with the international agreements designed to secure peace in Kosovo."
20
 The KVM 
concluded that Milosevic and Serbia, as well as the KLA to a lesser extent, failed to comply with 
UN Resolution 1199. Throughout January 1999, the US, the Contact Group, NATO, and the 
Russian government all called for compliance with the previously made agreements.
21
 On 
January 30, 1999, NATO warned that it will take military action if the agreements were not 
abided by.
22
 
 From February 6 to February 23, 1999, negotiations were conducted at Rambouillet, 
France between the Serbs and Kosovars, mediated by the US, EU, and Russia. The agreement 
concluded on February 23, 1999, the Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government In 
Kosovo, called for a complete ceasefire, for the KLA to lay down its arms, for Serbian forces to 
withdraw from Kosovo, for NATO peacekeeping forces on the ground to ensure compliance, as 
well as a political proposal for the democratic self-governance of Kosovo. Neither side signed 
the agreement. Though both verbally supported a political settlement, the Serbs refused NATO 
ground troops even for "peacekeeping" purposes.
23
 Talks resumed in Paris on March 15, 1999, 
and the Albanians agreed to sign the Interim Agreement. On March 18, 1999, the 40,000 man 
Yugoslav army organized in and around Kosovo. On the 20th the KVM withdrew, and on that 
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same day, the Yugoslav military moved into Kosovo and began attacking the Kosovar 
population.
24
 
 In a last-ditch effort to avoid war, on March 22, 1999, Holbrooke met with Milosevic to 
convey the final ultimatum for Serb compliance or NATO airstrikes would begin. Milosevic 
refused. On March 24, 1999 NATO warplanes began the 78 day bombing campaign in Serbia. In 
early June 1999, Milosevic agreed to a peace plan which required the removal of over 40,000 
Serbian troops from Kosovo.
25
 NATO approved this Military-Technical Agreement on June 10, 
1999 thereby ending the war in Kosovo.
26
 Following the conclusion of the NATO air campaign, 
Serb forces withdrew from Kosovo, under verification by KFOR (NATO's Kosovo peacekeeping 
force) which had been authorized by UN Resolution 1244, and the KLA de-militarized.
27
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CHAPTER 1: 
THE ETHICAL CASE FOR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
 
 This chapter lays out the justification given by US policymakers for the intervention in 
Kosovo based on moral and ethical reasons due to the atrocities committed by the Serb forces 
against the Kosovars. These atrocities revived memories of the Holocaust and the recent conflict 
in Bosnia to spur action based on moral "humanitarian" concerns. These actions were justified 
not only on the rhetoric of the atrocities but on Just War theory which states that it is not only an 
option but an obligation to intervene to protect civilians against a security threat to their basic 
survival as a people. A problem arises with the case in Kosovo due to the fact that the level of 
atrocities of both killings and displaced persons vastly increased following the initiation of the 
NATO bombing. This problem further raises the question of the role of ethics in US foreign 
policy and the efficacy of intervention. 
 The night the NATO bombing of Kosovo began, March 24, 1999, President Bill Clinton 
made a speech. He described the actions of the Serb forces against the Kosovar civilians in 
detail. His words to the country were:  
 "[n]ow they've started moving from village to village, shelling civilians and torching their 
 houses. We've seen innocent people taken from their homes, forced to kneel in the dirt, 
 and sprayed with bullets; Kosovar men dragged from their families, fathers and sons 
 together, lined up and shot in cold blood. This is not war in the traditional sense. It is an 
 attack by tanks and artillery on a largely defenseless people whose leaders already have 
 agreed to peace. Ending this tragedy is a moral imperative."
28
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In this speech, and multiple others, Clinton laid out the necessity of action based on moral 
grounds.  
Atrocities by Serb Forces in Kosovo 
 In order to understand where the arguments for humanitarian intervention based on ethics 
comes from, it helps to have an idea of the atrocities that happened in Kosovo prior to the 
intervention. While many incidents occurred in 1998 and 1999, a description focusing on the 
events in Drenica can illustrate the situation. The first turning point in the level of ethnic 
atrocities in the conflict in Kosovo were the attacks in the Drenica region of Kosovo in February 
and March 1998, the second being the NATO bombing campaign. A region in central Kosovo 
almost wholly populated by Albanians, Drenica is known for resistance against outside 
domination. In 1997 and 1998, Drenica was known to Albanians as the "liberated territory" 
because of the strength of the local KLA. The first major attacks by Serbian police forces in 
Drenica occurred on February 28 and March 1, 1998, in response to an attack on February 28, 
1998, by Albanians on a Serb police patrol in which four Serb officers were killed and two were 
wounded. While the perpetrators of these attacks deserved punishment, the Serb special police 
forces used "arbitrary and excessive force against the villagers long after resistance ceased."
29
 
They assaulted the villages of Likošane and Cirez with combat helicopters, armored vehicles, 
and artillery.
30
 Helicopters fired down indiscriminately on Cirez. One of the most terrible deaths 
was the murder of Rukia Nebihu, a twenty seven year old woman who was also seven months 
pregnant. She was shot in the face. Her father-in-law Sefer Nebihu who survived the attack told 
Human Rights Watch in an interview on May 24, 1998:  
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 "[t]he police destroyed my front gate with two tanks and came up to the windows of my 
 house. About seventeen policemen came out of the tanks. They wore military 
 camouflage, green and yellow, with a police sign on their chests. No masks. The tank 
 came up to the window. One policeman broke the window with the butt of his gun and 
 started shouting. They said “stand up” and I said “don't shoot because there are only 
 women and children here.” They cursed me and then one fired at me."31  
Sefer was then taken to his brothers house. There were twenty-three women and children inside. 
After they came out and lied down on the grass as asked, the policeman got into an argument. 
One said "kill them all” while some of the others said “we can't shoot them.”32 While these 
women and children were saved through the disagreement of the Serb forces, disregard for 
human life was clearly present, and this event exemplifies the mentality of some of the Serb 
forces regarding the Kosovars. In the end, Serb forces murdered twenty five Albanian civilians in 
the village of Likošane and Cirez.33 
 On March 5, 1998, the Serb police attacked the Jashari family compound in the village of 
Donji Prekaz for the second time, the first was in January 1998. Adem Jashari was well known 
for being a local KLA leader. However, in this attack an estimated 58 members of the Jashari 
family were killed, eighteen of whom were women and ten of whom were children under the age 
of sixteen including four young girls aged seven to thirteen. Some of the bodies were burned 
beyond recognition, which is the reason for the estimated body count. Serbs forces used artillery 
shelling to attack the family compound for hours and then stormed it using armored personal 
carriers and "special police forces in camouflage and face paint."
34
 The only member of the 
Jashari family that was in the house at the time who survived was eleven year old Besarte who 
hid. The police were brutal in their attack, when Qazim Jashari came out of the house with his 
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hands up, he was shot and killed on the front steps. Bahtijie Jashari recalls her son's death in 
these words:  
 "My son Nazim took a child of one and a half years to hide him from the police and tried 
 to help me along because I didn’t have my crutch. The police grabbed him by both arms 
 and stopped him from helping me. I begged them to let him go. They ordered my son to 
 lie down and then searched him for guns. Then they ordered him to stand up with his 
 hands in the air. It lasted only a few seconds. I clutched my head and started screaming. 
 All of a sudden, the police ordered Nazim to lie down again and emptied a whole 
 magazine into his back. They didn’t let me turn him face up."35 
The events in Drenica were a turning point in the crisis. The "brutal and indiscriminate attacks on 
women and children greatly radicalized the ethnic Albanian population and swelled the ranks of 
the KLA," turning them away from the non-violent policies of Rugova.
 36
 Similar attacks 
continued to occur in other villages in Kosovo.  
 Beginning in mid-May 1998, Milosevic began his first major government offensive. A 
Human Rights Watch report from October 1998 indicates that the special police in combination 
with the Yugoslav army attacked towns and villages along the Albanian border "with the specific 
intent of depopulating the region"
37
 This policy included shelling the villages before civilians 
had a chance to escape and placing "[l]andmines...in strategic points along the border."
38
 The 
villages were looted and systematically destroyed. The Serb forces sometimes fired on 
noncombatants by snipers, and an "undetermined number of people were taken into detention. In 
three cases, helicopters marked with the Red Cross emblem reportedly fired on civilians."
39
 
During the course of this campaign 15,000 people fled to Albania and 30,000 to Montenegro. 
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"One attack killed seventeen civilians who were hiding in the woods, and another killed three 
humanitarian aid workers who were trying to deliver food."
40
 Overall by October 1998, as 
Human Rights Watch's report indicates "[t]he majority of those killed and injured have been 
civilians. At least 250,000 people are currently displaced, many of them women and children 
now living without shelter in the mountains and woods. They face dire conditions with winter 
approaching. Many are too afraid to return to their homes, or have no homes to which they can 
return."
41
 The Serbs also restricted the activities of humanitarian aid agencies seeking to help the 
internally displaced. They "restricted access to needy populations, confiscated supplies, harassed 
and even attacked humanitarian aid workers."
42
 
 The events in Drenica in early 1998 were a prime example of the Serbian's 
disproportionate response in Kosovo, recalled by Richard Miles, U.S. Chief of Mission to 
Belgrade, as the main problem associated with Serbian actions in Kosovo. He recounts multiple 
discussions with Milosevic and Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs members about 
"proportionate response". He summarizes by saying he understood that the government "ha[d] a 
right to defend [its] interests as a leadership of a country, but if some 18 year old Kosovar 
Albanian shoots at a police station with a rifle, it doesn't mean that [government forces] go into 
the village where he came from with armored vehicles and machine guns and burn the place 
down. There has to be some proportionate response."
43
 Miles remembers that while he had many 
conversations about this with Milosevic, nothing changed because Milosevic believed he knew 
better "how to handle the Albanians" and "neither Milosevic or anybody else on the Serb side 
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really [ever] accepted the idea of proportionate response."
44
 This Serbian disproportional 
response against civilians was one of the primary justifications for Western intervention in the 
crisis. 
Policymaker's Moral Reasoning 
 In preparation for and in justifying the crisis to the American people and the world, 
President Clinton used vivid description of atrocities and made the moral necessity of acting in 
Kosovo one of his major points. In a speech at Arlington National Cemetery on Memorial Day 
1999, after the bombing had started, Clinton clearly stated, "[o]ur objectives in Kosovo are clear 
and consistent with the moral imperative of reversing ethnic cleansing and killing," before going 
on to mention the national security justifications for the intervention as well.
 45
 Clinton continued 
to justify the bombing campaign through humanitarian reasons, when he stated in a press 
conference on April 5, 1999, "I would far rather be standing here answering these questions with 
these people talking about this endeavor, than I would to be standing here having you ask me 
why we are permitting wholesale ethnic slaughter and ethnic cleansing and the creation of 
hundreds of thousands of refugees and not lifting a finger to do anything about it."
46
 This moral 
necessity to stop ethnic cleansing remained a common point in policymaker's rhetoric. 
 In October 1998, there was another round of negotiations between the Serbs and the 
West. In reference to these negotiations, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said, "I have 
asked Ambassador Holbrooke to return to Belgrade to convey a very clear and simple message to 
President Milosevic: he must comply in a manner that is both durable and verifiable, with the 
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longstanding political, humanitarian, and military demands of the international community, or 
face the gravest consequences."
47
 Addressing the humanitarian concerns was one of the primary 
conditions of negotiations, and when negotiations failed, humanitarian concerns became one of 
the primary justifications for intervention. Fast forward to the night of the bombing, March 24, 
1999, Clinton addressed the nation over the Kosovo issue and stated in clear terms, "Ending this 
tragedy is a moral imperative."
48
 Clinton continued by giving a more detailed history of the 
Kosovo conflict beginning with Milosevic's removal of Kosovo's autonomy in 1989, through the 
Kosovars' years of peaceful, nonviolent attempts to restore this autonomy, and into the violent 
struggle that characterized 1998 and 1999. Clinton emphasized how after negotiations at 
Rambouillet when the Kosovar leaders agreed to peace, "[e]ven though it does not give them all 
they want, even though their people were still being savaged, they saw that a just peace is better 
than a long and unwinnable war," the Serbians rejected it and instead "[a]s the Kosovars were 
saying yes to peace, Serbia stationed 40,000 troops in and around Kosovo in preparation for a 
major offensive—and in clear violation of the commitments they had made."49 Therefore, 
Clinton said, the United States must stand with the Kosovars against this threat to the security of 
a people for ethical reasons. 
 Clinton continually referred to Milosevic's actions against the Kosovars as the reasons for 
intervention, putting the blame squarely on Milosevic's shoulders. On April 2, 1999, he said, 
"We have to make sure that Mr. Milosevic pays a heavy price for this policy of repression. We 
have to seriously diminish his capacity to maintain that policy."
50
 Then on April 5, 1999, he 
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reiterated his point by saying, "Mr. Milosevic has created a humanitarian disaster in Kosovo. He 
can end it today by stopping the killing."
51
 Clinton made sure to emphasize the importance of 
Milosevic's actions against the Kosovars, when he said:  
 "As long as people have existed, there have been problems among people who were 
 different from one another, and there probably always will be. But you do not have 
 systematic slaughter in an effort to eradicate the religion, the culture, the heritage, the 
 very record of presence of a people in any area unless some politician thinks it is in his 
 interest to foment that sort of hatred. That's how these things happen. People with 
 organized political and military power decide it is in their interest, that they get 
 something out of convincing the people they control or they influence to go kill other 
 people and uproot them and dehumanize them."
52
 
Therefore Milosevic's actions spurred the conflict and created the distinction that necessitated 
intervention. This distinction clarified the difference "between people who can't resolve their 
problems peacefully and fight about it and people who resort to systematic ethnic cleansing and 
slaughter of people because of their religious or ethnic background."
53
 This difference is what 
made intervention in the conflict a moral obligation. 
 Clinton's vivid descriptions of atrocities contributed to what is known as the "CNN 
effect". The CNN effect is the "new global, real-time" media's substantial "ability to affect the 
conduct of U.S. diplomacy and foreign policy."
54
 From this, images, the framing of such images, 
and vivid accounts of atrocities accelerate and mold policy, and governments use the 
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opportunities provided by this media to justify intervention.
55
 The CNN effect creates public 
visibility of these crises and helps push for action based on moral concerns. Soderlund et al 
conclude in their empirical analysis of ten crises and their related interventions, or the lack 
thereof, that "the international community is more likely to respond to a serious crisis in a 
country of marginal strategic or economic importance if the mainstream media are effective in 
alerting populations to the crisis."
56
 While it may be overstated, it would be difficult to deny that 
the CNN effect exists given how these gripping accounts can spur public sympathy which can 
push leaders to act or aid them in justifying their actions.
57
 Bahador's study of the CNN effect in 
regards to the Kosovo conflict concludes that the CNN effect was a motivating factor regarding 
intervention in Kosovo, and the media's highlighting of certain events such as the Drenica and 
Racak massacres, combined with Clinton's vicious attacks on Milosevic and vivid descriptions of 
atrocities helped aid this effect and emphasized the moral justifications for intervention.
58
 
The Legacy of Past Genocides 
 Clinton also remembered the legacy of the Holocaust and Bosnia in pushing for and 
justifying action in Kosovo. In a speech on April 15, 1999, Clinton explicitly referred to this 
connection when he stated, "We must follow the example of the World War II generation, by 
standing up to aggression and hate."
59
 Clinton also implied the connection in statements like this 
one from April 3, 1999, "Right now, in the middle of Europe, at the doorstep of NATO, an entire 
people are being made to abandon their homeland or die -- not because of anything they've done, 
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but simply because of who they are."
60
 This statement brings to mind clear imagery of the 
Holocaust and the ethnic cleansing of the Jews, also in the middle of Europe. In a speech on 
Kosovo from May 13, 1999, Clinton utilized the comparison when he said, "Though 
[Milosevic's] ethnic cleansing is not the same as the ethnic extermination of the Holocaust, the 
two are related; both vicious, premeditated, systematic oppression fueled by religious and ethnic 
hatred. This campaign to drive the Kosovars from their land and to indeed erase their very 
identity is an affront to humanity and attack not only on a people, but on the dignity of all 
people."
61
 The comparison with the Holocaust was a vivid and emotion laden argument for 
intervention in Kosovo. 
 The connection to and memory of both the genocides of the Holocaust and in Bosnia, but 
especially the Holocaust, produced an emotional reaction to the crisis in Kosovo and were used 
to justify US involvement. On the eve of the bombing, Clinton dreamed of a counterfactual 
history if the Holocaust could have been prevented. He stated: 
 "Sarajevo, the capital of neighboring Bosnia, is where World War I began. World War II 
 and the Holocaust engulfed this region. In both wars, Europe was slow to recognize the 
 dangers, and the United States waited even longer to enter the conflicts. Just imagine if 
 leaders back then had acted wisely and early enough, how many lives could have been 
 saved, how many Americans would not have had to die."
62
 
This memory and possibility seems like it could almost be enough on its own to justify 
intervention in Kosovo. Marc Grossman, Assistant Secretary of State of European Affairs during 
the time of the Kosovo crisis, related a conversation he remembers with Madeleine Albright 
which he dictated in these terms, "we will not have people put on railway cars in Europe for the 
second time in this century. We just can't have it. What did we learn from the Holocaust? What 
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did we learn from World War II? We learned that you can't just turn your back on this kind of 
activity."
63
 This relationship between the memory of the Holocaust and the current situation in 
Kosovo provided more than just an emotional connection for the public but also made ethnic 
cleansing a serious moral consideration for policymakers. 
 Even more important than the memory of the Holocaust, was memory of the recent 
events in Bosnia. The connection to Bosnia was forged long before Western attention was 
attracted to the region. In December 1997, before many of the atrocities of the Serbs against the 
Kosovars even occurred, much less were brought to light, there was an opinion article published 
in the New York Times which laid out the possibility of crisis in the region. This article, entitled 
"Bosnia II?" commented on how, while the delegates from around the world met to discuss the 
success of the Dayton Accords regarding the situation in Bosnia, the world was ignoring the 
potential conflict in Kosovo. The piece highlighted the danger posed by the rise of the KLA 
when combined with the already present, though minor compared to those to come, attacks and 
discrimination against the Kosovars by the Serbs.
64
 While the conflict had yet to erupt, the signs 
were clear to those who paid attention. Soon the connection to the conflict in Bosnia would 
become more important to the people and policymakers than that of an opinion article title. 
 The connection between the conflict in Kosovo and that in Bosnia is striking. In both 
cases, in the 1990s Serbian forces committed flagrant atrocities against a Muslim people. 
Milosevic, though he was not technically the leader of the Serb forces in Bosnia as he was in 
Kosovo, was considered to be a strong influence on Serb nationalism and aggression. In both 
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cases, Serb forces were combating an enemy who fought back violently, but also in both cases, 
the Serb forces responded to violent attacks with even more vicious attacks against civilians. 
Both crises occurred in the Balkans in the wake of the collapse of the former Communist state of 
Yugoslavia. Both ended due to some form of Western intervention led by the United States. 
However the cases were also very different. In Bosnia, massacres on a much larger scale, such as 
that in Srebrenica in which 8000 Bosnian Muslims were systematically murdered and thousands 
of women were raped in view of 100 incapable Dutch peacekeepers needed to occur before a 
sustained Western military intervention was planned.
65
 The memory of the slow response in 
Bosnia which led to almost 40,000 civilian deaths spurred quicker action in Kosovo to prevent a 
crisis on the same scale.
66
 
 Many policymakers worked to learn the lessons of Bosnia, even more so than those of the 
Holocaust, by acting in Kosovo. Grossman was very blunt about this point. He said in an 
interview, "no one's perfect. You [policymakers] have to learn your lessons, but the lesson in 
Bosnia was, you have to intervene early, not late...at the very very very senior levels of 
government, all decisions are hard, all the options are bad...so you try to learn your lessons." 
Srebrenica was a "human tragedy" and lessons from the Bosnian conflict had to be learned in 
order to prevent another similar tragedy from occurring.
67
 Clinton stated at the start of the 
bombing:  
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 "We learned some of the same lessons in Bosnia just a few years ago. The world did not 
 act early enough to stop that war, either. And let's not forget what happened: innocent 
 people herded into concentration camps, children gunned down by snipers on their way to 
 school, soccer fields and parks turned into cemeteries, a quarter of a million people 
 killed, not because of anything they have done but because of who they were. Two 
 million Bosnians became refugees. This was genocide in the heart of Europe, not in 1945 
 but in 1995; not in some grainy newsreel from our parents' and grandparents' time but in 
 our own time, testing our humanity and our resolve."
68
 
Policymakers could not forget the recent events in Bosnia, even more so than the Holocaust 
which they were further removed from, because the reports from Kosovo were reviving these 
same moral concerns. 
 Clinton continued in comparing the two conflicts, when he stated "[w]e learned that in 
the Balkans, inaction in the face of brutality simply invites more brutality, but firmness can stop 
armies and save lives. We must apply that lesson in Kosovo before what happened in Bosnia 
happens there, too."
69
 The level of the atrocities in Kosovo were nowhere near the scale of those 
in Bosnia, but that was the point. Even though diplomats and leaders such as Clinton and Blair 
espoused the necessity of intervention on moral grounds by detailing the atrocities that had 
occurred, the level of the carnage was much smaller than that in Bosnia, Rwanda, and definitely 
the Holocaust. But in the minds of the leaders, the atrocities that were beginning to occur in 
Kosovo, primarily beginning in 1998, were a forerunner of future horrors similar to that in many 
memories and something had to be done to protect these civilians before the situation got out of 
hand. Clinton even addressed this point specifically on March 19, 1999, just days before the 
bombing but after the rejection by the Serb government of the last set of negotiations at 
Rambouillet, when he said "If we don't act, the war will spread. If it spreads, we will not be able 
to contain it without greater risks and costs.... I do not believe we ought to have thousands more 
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people slaughtered and buried in open soccer fields before we do something."
70
 In Kosovo, 
Western leaders acted  early in order to prevent the humanitarian disaster they predicted would 
follow. 
Just War Theory 
 In the New York Times, a speech by Clinton was published entitled "A Just and Necessary 
War". This speech went on to detail the horrible conditions that arose in Kosovo in the prior ten 
years, followed by references to the similarities of the experiences in Croatia and Bosnia. Clinton 
stated, "We cannot respond to such tragedies everywhere, but when ethnic conflict turns into 
ethnic cleansing where we can make a difference, we must try, and that is clearly the case in 
Kosovo. Had we faltered, the result would have been a moral and strategic disaster."
71
 Clinton 
drew on these moral considerations to rationalize intervention, but the designation of the war as 
just requires the satisfaction of other claims by US policymakers. 
 Born out of classical and religious philosophy, a theory of just war was gradually 
formalized throughout the Middle Ages and into modern times. This "just war theory" combines 
politics and ethics in a way that brings moral conduct and human rights into the realm of 
politics.
72
 What is today considered "humanitarian intervention" is born out of the doctrine of 
just war initially developed in the Middle Ages.
73
 Discussion of just war theory is separated into 
two types, jus ad bellum which refers to the reasons for going to war and jus in bello, which 
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refers to the conduct of warfare.
 74
 This discussion will focus on jus ad bellum tradition in order 
to explain the policymaker's reasoning for intervening in Kosovo rather than the actions within 
the intervention itself.  
 Just war theory is born out of idealism which makes sense because so is the basic premise 
of humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian intervention arises when "a process by which an 
ethical response to a large-scale tragedy is first aroused and then translated into political 
action."
75
 Humanitarian intervention fits the just war framework very well. The primary points of  
jus ad bello theory are right authority, just cause, right intention, last resort, proportionality, 
reasonable hope, relative justice, and open declaration.
76
 The most important points related to 
humanitarian intervention and the crisis in Kosovo are, "right authority", "just cause", and "last 
resort". Therefore, according to the just war tradition, the only reasons that military intervention 
in Kosovo would be reasonable, justified, and, beyond that, necessary is if there was just cause, 
there were no other options available, and if the international community had the right to 
intervene.  
 Given the failure at Rambouillet and other negotiations prior to the initiation of Operation 
Allied Force (NATO's bombing campaign), the condition of last resort could be seen in the eyes 
of policymakers to be fulfilled. This belief is confirmed by the statement given by Dr. Javier 
Solana, Secretary General of NATO, on the eve of the bombing which emphasized that "[a]ll 
efforts to achieve a negotiated, political solution to the Kosovo crisis having failed, no alternative 
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is open but to take military action."
77
 However, there still remains the questions of what is just 
cause and does/did the international community have the authority to intervene? 
 Right authority in humanitarian intervention is difficult to answer yet closely related to 
just cause. Many interventions are considered "legitimized" by UN Security Council approval, 
which was not given in the case of Kosovo, a subject that will be further discussed in the third 
chapter. Without this UN approval, the actions of the United States and many of the European 
states in Kosovo could be viewed as impinging on the sovereignty of Serbia, therefore not 
meeting the criteria of "right authority". However, the balance between states' rights and human 
rights is heavily debated in international law and humanitarian intervention literature, and 
therefore conflicts with this notion that the Western intervention in Kosovo was unjustified 
because the West did not have the authority to declare a "just war".
78
 In the modern world, as 
Christopher Greenwood says in regards to his analysis of the legality of the interventions in Iraq, 
Liberia, and Somalia, "[i]t is no longer tenable to assert that whenever a government massacres 
its own people or a state collapses into anarchy, international law forbids military intervention 
altogether."
79
 Based on modern theories of cosmopolitanism in international relations, the 
individual's rights are just as important, if not more important than that of states; from this idea, 
"[s]tates have rights only if they promote the rights and welfare of their citizens."
80
 Therefore if 
an individual's rights, human rights, matter, when a government impinges on their personal 
sovereignty, then anyone, including the international community could intervene to restore those 
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rights.
81
 While this debate between state sovereignty and human rights cannot be answered 
definitively by any one person, the existence of this debate itself provides reasoning and 
justification for those, who agree with the side on cosmopolitanism and the importance of human 
rights, for intervention within their rightful authority as long as there is just cause. 
 While the only legal argument in international law for just cause is self-defense, the 
traditions of just war provide another reason which is supported by many modern reactions to 
atrocities in the twentieth century. In modern just war theory, "[a]ggression need not be directed 
against one's own to trigger jus ad bellum argument. The offense of aggression may be 
committed against a nation or a people incapable of defending itself against a determined 
adversary. If one can intervene to assist the injured party, one is justified in doing so, provided 
that [the] other considerations are met."
82
 Clinton's words in his speech "A Just and Necessary 
War" cited earlier parallel this idea. Traditions of just war theory state that war is just when it is 
"punishing a transgression" and against "harm [that] has been inflicted" and can include "defense 
of the innocent as a just cause."
83
 A similar consideration promoted "war on behalf of the 
oppressed", primarily taken from a religious standpoint, as a justification for intervention.
84
 Just 
war theory can then be taken a step further to indicate that "humanitarian intervention is justified 
when it is directed against actions that contravene the moral convictions of ordinary people."
85
 
Therefore when a government takes disproportionate violent action against civilians it is not only 
the right but the duty for the international community to intervene. Similar arguments are made 
by qualifying genocide and other human rights violations as "crimes against humanity" from 
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which just cause legitimizes international intervention.
86
 Beyond the basic definition of just 
cause, which is self-defense, defense of others is considered within just war theory, especially in 
modern times, as a legitimate "just cause" and reason for intervention. 
 Proponents of "just war theory" use the UN charter as further justification for 
intervention. Many tend to use Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter which states that "all 
Members pledge themselves to take joint action in cooperation with the Organization for the 
achievement of...universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all..." as saying that intervention is not only permitted on humanitarian grounds but 
is actually required for UN members.
87
 These considerations allowed policymakers, in 
conjunction with rhetoric regarding the "humanitarian atrocities" occurring in Kosovo, spurred 
on by the CNN effect, to justify the intervention in 1999.  
The Effects of "Humanitarian" Intervention 
 There is one major problem with the "humanitarian" part of humanitarian intervention in 
the case of Kosovo. While the fact that the intervention was justified based on moral concerns 
for the security of the Kosovars against growing levels atrocities committed by Serb forces is 
clear, in reality the level of atrocities skyrocketed after the bombing began. This distinction is 
highlighted by Hideaki Shinoda in his article on the politics of legitimacy regarding the 
intervention. Shinoda points out the "gray area between law and politics,... the need to discuss 
the issue of responsibility and accountability in the context of humanitarian intervention."
88
 
Though policymakers may have fulfilled the "ethics of intention" in the case of Kosovo due to 
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the atrocities of the Serbians in the region which, when combined with "the reluctant acceptance 
of [NATO's] intervention by many other nations [as] a sign of recognition of its political 
legitimacy,... the ethics of responsibility, which concerns the result, not the motivation, is the 
target of criticisms and suspicions" due to the effects of the campaign.
 89
 
 Though the intervention was purported to stop the violence against civilians before it 
could get out of hand, as it did in Bosnia, the intervention did just the opposite in that the 
violence against civilians massively increased after March 24, 1999. Although it is unknown 
what would have happened had no intervention occurred given clear intentions by Milosevic to 
subjugate the Kosovar people, the facts that occurred in reality are well documented. It is 
difficult to compare the situation on the ground before and after the bombing started as many of 
the atrocities committed before the bombing started are not well documented due to Serb 
repression, censorship, and the unclear nature of many of the reports. The documentation 
regarding those committed after the bombing started are clear. Between March and June 1999, 
almost 900,000 Kosovar Albanians were forcibly expelled from Kosovo and another 600,000 
were considered internally displaced persons within Kosovo. Therefore almost 1.5 million 
people were forced out of their homes during this conflict.
90
 These numbers add up to almost 
90% of the 1998 population of Kosovar Albanians (1.7 million).
91
 It is estimated that Serb forces 
killed around 10,000 Kosovar Albanians during the conflict.
92
 Aside from the "forcible 
displacement of Kosovar Albanian civilians" and systematic killings, during the conflict, Serb 
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forces used tactics of torture and systematic rape against civilians as well as looted and burned 
civilian's homes and businesses. "Over 1,200 residential areas were at least partially burned after 
late March 1999, [including] over 500 villages."
93
 Serb forces would use refugees as "human 
shields...to escort military convoys and shield facilities throughout the province."
94
 Serb forces 
"systematically separated military-aged men from the general population as Kosovars were 
expelled. These men were detained in facilities ranging from cement factories to prisons. Many 
of these detainees were forced to dig trenches and were physically abused."
95
 Serb forces also 
"burned, destroyed, or exhumed bodies from mass graves in an attempt to destroy evidence."
96
 
All these tactics as well as many other forms of persecution occurred in Kosovo following the 
commencement of the NATO bombing. While many of these atrocities had already been 
occurring throughout the region prior to March 1999, the bombing escalated these horrors to 
level not seen before in the area. 
 The effect of the Western intervention in Kosovo was increased displacement and death 
of the Kosovar Albanian citizens the Western policy meant to protect. After diplomatic 
negotiations ceased and the NATO military effort began, Milosevic instituted a campaign against 
civilians much more drastic in scale than that seen before in the region. This effect brings up a 
curious consideration regarding humanitarian intervention. Is the idea of intervention to stop 
atrocities before they get out of hand a correct one? Does this policy not allow leaders, like 
Milosevic, to pull out all the stops and fully enact their destructive policies? When can 
intervention protect civilians and when, as in Kosovo, does it actually place them in more 
danger? To answer these questions would require much more study and empirical research not 
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covered in this thesis, however one conclusion can be drawn. Though ethics and moral guidance 
are important when conducting foreign policy, care must be taken make sure this policy does not 
endanger those whom this policy wishes to protect, rather than making the assumption that by 
intervening in a conflict the violence against civilians will be immediately stopped. 
 Ethics do play a role in US foreign policy out of which humanitarian intervention is born. 
President Clinton made clear the moral justifications of intervention, his claims perpetuated by 
the CNN effect, and could be justified by considerations of just war theory which all led to 
NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999. However, though these "humanitarian" causes may be 
clear and in some eyes intervention may be justified if not required, the reality of the situation is 
still important (which in Kosovo means the increase in the level of atrocities following the 
commencement of NATO's air campaign) and must be taken into consideration when 
policymakers consider whether military intervention is the right course of action, not only in 
Kosovo but in other situations now and in the future. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN NATIONAL SECURITY 
 
 Humanitarian intervention is not only an ethical or moral matter, it can also be in the 
national security interest of the United States. This chapter lays out US policymaker's 
justification for and their reasons for intervening in Kosovo based on national security concerns. 
US national interests balance the pragmatic and the ethical in Kosovo and policymakers show 
this through emphasizing Kosovo's location and the need to maintain European stability for both 
political and economic reasons. Furthermore, as the US's primary security alliance, fulfilling 
NATO's goals is also important to US national security. One major issue is, when does 
involvement in a crisis justify military intervention? Bringing US troops into the mix heightens 
the importance of a situation and needs to be justified in relation to US national interests. 
National Interests 
 While a country's specific national interests are continually evolving based on the current 
times and policymakers, overall a country's national interest depends on its security and 
economic interests. National interests can be divided into subcategories based on urgency. While 
third party humanitarian intervention will rarely concern any very urgent issue of national 
security, which usually deals with the survival of the nation, humanitarian intervention can 
directly relate to the security of close allies or strategic resources which would be just below 
national survival on a scale of national interests. Humanitarian intervention can even be in the 
national interest of a country if the goal is to protect less important allies and non-critical 
34 
resources, however in these cases humanitarian intervention would not be as "urgent" a security 
concern.
97
 
 Humanitarian crises matter to US national interests. Purely humanitarian crises might be 
of minor interest but the US still has an interest in working to resolve these crises in order to 
further US values and prevent escalation and worse crises. In some cases, humanitarian 
intervention can be within the direct national interest of the United States due to connections 
with economic and/or political allies. Humanitarian crises in Europe are especially important to 
the US as Europe is one of the US's closest allies. Therefore, the intervention in Kosovo in 1999 
was justified and worked to serve, protect, and further US national interests for geopolitical 
reasons for creating and maintaining a stable Europe. 
 In December 1999, President Clinton and the White House released a document stating 
its overall national security strategy: the strategy that it had tried to follow during the past eight 
years of Clinton's presidency, and the strategy that it hoped to put forth for the future. This 
document, entitled "A National Security Strategy for a New Century" straightforwardly laid out 
the basic ideas of US foreign policy. On the first page of the document, following Clinton's 
preface, it clearly defined what were US national interests. The most important of these were 
"vital interests—those of broad, overriding importance to the survival, safety and vitality of our 
nation."
98
 It is difficult to envision a situation in which a humanitarian crisis could threaten the 
country's vital interests. However the second level was "important national interests". Important 
national interests were those that "do not affect our national survival, but they do affect our 
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national well-being and the character of the world in which we live. Important national interests 
include, for example, regions in which we have a sizable economic stake or commitments to 
allies, protecting the global environment from severe harm, and crises with a potential to 
generate substantial and highly destabilizing refugee flows."
99
 The document goes on to state 
that US involvement in Kosovo was within the category of "important national interests" to the 
United States.  
 The third category was "humanitarian and other interests" stating that "[i]n some 
circumstances our nation may act because our values demand it."
100
 The document goes on to list 
several examples including: "responding to natural and  manmade disasters; promoting human 
rights and seeking to halt gross violations of those rights; supporting democratization, adherence 
to the rule of law and civilian control of the military; assisting humanitarian demining; and 
promoting sustainable development and environmental protection."
101
 The reason humanitarian 
interests are important to US national security, the document explains, is because "[t]he spread of 
democracy and respect for the rule of law helps to create a world community that is more 
hospitable to U.S. values and interests."
102
 Therefore, "[w]henever possible, we [the US] seek to 
avert humanitarian disasters and conflict through diplomacy and cooperation with a wide range 
of partners, including other governments, international institutions and non-governmental 
organizations. This may not only save lives, but also prevent crises from getting worse and 
becoming a greater drain on resources."
103
 This national security strategy set forth by the White 
House clearly defines responding to humanitarian issues as within the national interests of the 
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country. However, in some cases, such as in Kosovo, a humanitarian crisis can be of even greater 
importance to the US if it concerns one of the US's important interests. 
 In order to safeguard the security of the nation and confront these issues, the document 
states that the "United States must lead abroad if we are to be secure at home."
104
 The US acts in 
this manner and engages in the world in order to fulfill its "three core objectives: enhancing 
American security; bolstering our economic prosperity; and promoting democracy and human 
rights abroad, which we strongly believe will, in turn, advance the first two goals."
105
 The US 
protects its interests, "enhances American security", and confronts humanitarian crises, through 
multiple methods, most of which are non-violent. However, the use of military force can be 
considered in certain situations as dictated by the country's national interests. The document 
addresses situations, similar to Kosovo, which threaten important US national interests. In 
conducting foreign policy in "situations posing a threat to important national interests, military 
forces should only be used if they advance U.S. interests, they are likely to accomplish their 
objectives, the costs and risks of their employment are commensurate with the interests at stake, 
and other non-military means are incapable of achieving our objectives. Such uses of military 
forces should be selective and limited, reflecting the importance of the interests at stake. We act 
in concert with the international community whenever possible, but do not hesitate to act 
unilaterally when necessary."
106
 
 The second core objective of US national security is "bolstering economic prosperity". 
The economic component of US policy is essential and often connected to humanitarian issues. 
In an increasingly globalized world "[a]s national economies become more integrated 
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internationally, U.S. prosperity depends more than ever on economic developments abroad. 
Cooperation with other states and international organizations is vital to protecting the health of 
the global economic system and responding to financial crises."
107
 This objective included 
maintaining its major economic alliances. 
 The third core objective of US national security policy is particularly applicable to 
humanitarian issues, as its purpose is to "promote democracy, human rights, and respect for the 
rule of law."
108
 Ethnic cleansing, genocide, and ethnic conflict are in stark opposition to this 
goal. Aside from being "a great challenge to our values and our security,... ethnic conflict can 
threaten regional stability and may give rise to potentially serious national security concerns."
109
 
US policy acknowledges that every situation is different and there are many methods (military, 
economic pressure, political pressure, diplomacy) for dealing with humanitarian crises, but these 
crises are of interest to the United States. 
 Beyond defining US national interests, the objectives and policy recommendations put 
forth in "A National Security Strategy for a New Century" were specified by region. Europe was 
the first region addressed, and the section concerning it the longest in the document, compared to 
the other regions. In this section it is clearly stated that "European stability is vital to our own 
security."
110
 This stability and US engagement in Europe is multi-faceted. The US's first strategic 
goal is "to build a Europe that is truly integrated, democratic, prosperous and at peace."
111
 Within 
this goal, "NATO remains the anchor of American engagement in Europe and the linchpin of 
transatlantic security. As the leading guarantor of European security and a force for European 
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stability, NATO must play a leading role in promoting a more integrated and secure Europe, 
prepared to respond to new challenges."
112
 A second component of the US-European connection 
is economic.  
 Specifically, the issues in Kosovo were important to US national interests due to its 
geographic location. As mentioned above, humanitarian intervention can be in the national 
interest of a country if it concerns the security interests of close allies. The European Union was 
(and is) one of the United States' closest allies and the security of Europe as a continent was 
essential to US national interests. Therefore, the issues in Kosovo were at the heart of US 
national interests and consequently, attempts at negotiations and diplomacy backed by a credible 
threat of force were an essential component of US foreign policy.  
 Europe as a continent, and more specifically, the European Union was (and is) one of the 
United States' most important allies. This alliance was essential both politically and 
economically. In the 1990s, one of the primary goals of the European Union was to expand into 
Eastern Europe. This desire included a security component. In order for the European Union to 
expand, the countries of Europe needed to be safe and stable. Instability within Europe along the 
edges of the European Union was considered dangerous not only to the countries of the EU but 
also to the United States, its closest ally. 
Kosovo in US National Interests 
 The issue in Kosovo exemplified a major aspect of US foreign policy, a commitment to 
Europe and European stability, both political and economic. Ambassador Marc Grossman, the 
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, enunciated that the United States "had 
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embarked ... on a philosophy, a policy, in favor of a Europe whole, free, and at peace."
113
 In 
order to pursue this policy the US had to be committed even when conflicts arose. History had 
shown that a European problem "often becomes also an American problem, with great costs 
attached to it," however Thomas Pickering, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, 
continued in a statement on March 15, 1999, "[t]here is a cost to taking action. But in Kosovo, 
the cost of inaction is immeasurably higher."
 114
 In this statement, a high level US official 
supports humanitarian intervention as a necessary response to the crisis in Kosovo because given 
Kosovo's location in Europe and the instability of the situation, the risks of military action are 
worth it in his eyes. 
 In a speech about the overall intentions and goals of US foreign policy in February 1999, 
President Clinton laid out five challenges for the US to work on. The first challenge was "to 
build a more peaceful 21st century world."
115
 This is a very broad goal but Clinton acknowledges 
that the first step in working towards this challenge laid in Europe. The reason for this is that the 
twentieth century was dominated by two very bloody European wars followed by the Cold War. 
That was why Clinton stated he had "worked hard to build a Europe that finally is undivided, 
democratic and at peace. We want all of Europe to have what America helped build in Western 
Europe -- a community that upholds common standards of human rights, where people have the 
confidence and security to invest in the future, where nations cooperate to make war 
unthinkable."
116
 In another speech on Memorial Day in 1999, Clinton reiterated this point that 
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the United States had an "overwhelming national interest in a peaceful, undivided Europe, which 
will ensure we will not have to send large numbers of young Americans to die there in the next 
century in a war."
117
 Clinton continually maintaind the importance of an undivided and stable 
Europe to US interests in relation to his comments on the necessity of intervening in Kosovo. 
 The lessons of the 20th century taught Clinton and his advisors that "if America is going 
to be prosperous and secure, we need a Europe that is prosperous, secure, undivided, and free. 
We need a Europe that is coming together, not falling apart, a Europe that shares our values and 
shares the burdens of leadership. That is the foundation on which the security of our children will 
depend."
118
 This goal and a strong US-European bond was, and is, especially important in the 
modern, globalizing world because as Clinton stated in yet a different speech in May 1999, "in 
this age of growing international interdependence, America needs a strong and peaceful Europe 
more than ever as our partner for freedom and for economic progress, and our partner against 
terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and instability."
119
 Therefore, solving the 
Kosovo crisis wa a "significant security issue"
120
 to help complete the "promise of a Europe 
undivided, democratic and at peace."
121
 Clinton also stressed the multitude of reasons why 
European interests were important to US interests and the range of the connection between the 
two which made Kosovo a major security issue. 
 In the late 1990s, this policy was even more crucial considering the circumstances that 
arose from the end of the Cold War. At this time, much of Eastern Europe was working on 
developing democratic systems and making progress to joining the European Union, the Balkans 
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was the last part of what is geographically considered Europe that could not be considered to be 
making progress to being "whole, free, and at peace."
122
 Problems in the Balkans were very 
"disruptive" to this process.
 123
 The United States needed to care about Kosovo because of its 
impact on the rest of the region. David Leavy, the chief spokesperson for the National Security 
Council, compared the Balkans to a "cancer ... in the heart of Europe... [that could be] very de-
stabilizing for [our] European allies, [especially] the newly formed democracies of Eastern 
Europe."
124
 Therefore it was a "real national security imperative to bring stability and peace to a 
very volatile region."
125
 The structure and instability of the post-Cold War world made this goal 
and aggressive support to achieve this goal even more important. 
 In this post-Cold War world, the countries of Eastern Europe were not stable. Therefore 
Kosovo's location also caused problems because of the neighboring "small countries struggling 
with their own economic and political challenges, countries that could be overwhelmed by a 
large, new wave of refugees from Kosovo."
126
 While these issues may seem detached from the 
day-to-day lives of Americans, Clinton considered it important enough to "justify the dangers to 
[US] armed forces [because he was] convinced that the dangers of acting [were] far outweighed 
by the dangers of not acting—dangers to defenseless people and to our national interests."127 
Clinton believed he had "a responsibility as President to deal with problems such as this before 
they do permanent harm to our national interests. America has a responsibility to stand with our 
allies when they are trying to save innocent lives and preserve peace, freedom, and stability in 
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Europe,"
128
 and that is why the US acted in Kosovo. The crisis in Kosovo indicated the volatility 
and danger in the situation to the broader region which could in turn ignite further conflict. 
 The conflict in Kosovo was a threat to US national interests because it could spread 
further into Europe and affect US allies. Clinton said the "biggest remaining danger to this 
progress [towards a peaceful Europe] has been the fighting and the repression in Kosovo."
129
 
Due to this threat, the US has "a clear national interest in ensuring that Kosovo is where this 
trouble ends."
130
 The conflict needs to stop in Kosovo because, Clinton predicted "[i]f it 
continues, it almost certainly will draw in Albania and Macedonia, which share borders with 
Kosovo, and on which clashes have already occurred. Potentially, it could affect our allies, 
Greece and Turkey. It could spark tensions in Bosnia itself, jeopardizing the gains made 
there."
131
 Clinton feared that the conflict in Kosovo, if left unchecked would not only lead to 
"more atrocities, more refugees, more victims crying out for justice and seeking out revenge,"
132
 
but, even worse, Clinton believed that "if we don't stop the conflict now, it clearly will spread. 
And then we will not be able to stop it, except at far greater cost and risk."
133
 The risk of the 
conflict spreading, and the destabilizing nature of this concern, in an already volatile region, 
made solving the Kosovo crisis important to US national interests concerning European stability. 
 At the time President Clinton clearly expressed the "national interest" component of the 
justification for intervention in Kosovo precisely because of its location and to help complete this 
vision of Europe. Clinton said that the US acted in Kosovo "to prevent a wider war, to diffuse a 
powder keg at the heart of Europe that has exploded twice before in this century with 
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catastrophic results. And we act to stand united with our allies for peace. By acting now, we are 
upholding our values, protecting our interests, and advancing the cause of peace."
134
 Clinton 
points out that Kosovo stands at the "fault line between Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, at the 
meeting place of Islam and both the Western and Orthodox branches of Christianity."
135
 It was 
not only the political implications regarding Kosovo's location in Europe that made acting in 
Kosovo important but the ethnic and religious concerns that arose due to its location as well. 
 The United States' security connection included an economic component as well as the 
political one. Europe is one of our largest trading partners and as David Leavy pointed out, "a 
stable Europe [was and is] critical for our economic growth" which when combined with the 
historical notion that the Balkans are a "tinderbox" for conflict, made the situation in Kosovo a 
major issue for the United States.
136
 The US's "National Security Strategy for a New Century" 
states that "Europe is a key element in America's global commercial engagement. Europe and the 
United States produce almost half of all global goods and services; more than 60% of total U.S. 
investment abroad is in Europe; and fourteen million workers on both sides of the Atlantic earn 
their livelihoods from transatlantic commerce."
137
 In 1998, the United States and the European 
Union traded over 350 billion dollars worth of goods, making the European Union the United 
States' second largest trading partner overall, and the United States' largest trading partner 
outside of the North American Free Trade Agreement.
138
 This trade was essential to the United 
States. Half of US direct investment abroad in 1999, over 625 billion dollars worth, was in 
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Europe.
139
 Maintaining a stable Europe was both politically and economically essential to the 
well being of the United States. 
 The United States is (and was in 1997-1999) the world's largest economy.
140
 One way for 
the United States to maintain this position is and was to ensure the stability of its largest trading 
partners. In the late 1990s, much of Eastern Europe was working to meet the political and 
economic standards of the European Union in order to become members. This expansion was 
greatly desired by the US for both political and economic reasons. Writing in 1998, economist 
Nicholas V. Gianaris says that "[t]he costs of a fragmented European market in the past were 
high, while the benefits from a unified European market in the future are expected to be 
significant...[w]ithout international cooperation...economic growth on a national and global level 
will stagnate."
141
 Therefore stability and economic growth in Europe was essential to the United 
States economic and political future. 
 The conflict in Kosovo was also essential to US national security because of NATO. In 
the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War. NATO had a new goal. This goal, as stated by 
NATO's Secretary General Manfred Wörner in 1990 was "to finally realize our vision of a free 
and united Europe based on a secure and lasting order of peace."
142
 Included in this order of 
peace were "human rights and free choice for all its citizens, equality before the law, openness of 
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borders, self-determination, democracy and the protection of minority rights."
143
 This goal 
required a strong alliance and support from within Europe and the United States.  Wörner 
proclaimed six tasks of NATO working in cooperation with the European Community (later the 
European Union) for the future. The first one was "to support the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe in their efforts to build democracy and successful economies. Without our help, 
they stand no chance."
144
 The intervention in Kosovo clearly works towards this goal by trying to 
ensure self-determination for the Kosovars. The third task was "to build a new security system 
for the whole of Europe".
145
 In order to extend security throughout Europe, the instability and 
conflict in the Balkans had to be dealt with. Upholding NATO's values and interests and 
fulfilling NATO's goals was important to US national security as NATO was (and is) the United 
States' primary security alliance. 
When Military Intervention is Considered Necessary? 
 Given the importance of Europe to US national interests, effective diplomacy to resolve 
crises in Europe were especially important to US policymakers. When diplomacy fails, the 
question arises of when a military solution is necessary and the right course of action. In Kosovo, 
the importance in US policy of backing diplomacy with force combined with Milosevic's 
personality made military intervention the correct next step in the eyes of US policymakers. 
 The US had a policy that its diplomacy be backed by force because in order to maintain 
the United States' position in the world and its security it must not back down. To accomplish 
these ends, US diplomacy had to be backed with the credible threat of force in order to succeed. 
Then, when diplomacy fails, this force must be used to maintain and secure US interests. As 
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Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said in relation to NATO's threat of air strikes just prior to 
the commencement of the negotiations at Rambouillet, ''[o]ur strategy of diplomacy backed by 
the threat of force is the only way to ensure that both sides halt the violence and come 
immediately to the negotiating table."
146
 Threat of force needs to support US diplomatic efforts 
otherwise those efforts would be futile.  
 This policy explains US behavior in 1999. NATO only used a military solution after 
Milosevic rejected multiple sets of negotiations and broke multiple ceasefires in 1998 and 1999. 
As Clinton said in a statement on March 22, 1999, "[i]f President Milosevic continues to choose 
aggression over peace, NATO's military plans must continue to move forward. Our objective in 
Kosovo remains clear: to stop the killing and achieve a durable peace that restores Kosovars to 
self-government."
147
 Therefore the solution was to use military force to limit Milosevic's 
capabilities since he refused to submit to diplomatic pressure and negotiations. Basically as 
Clinton said just before the bombing began "if President Milosevic will not make peace, we will 
limit his ability to make war."
148
 In Kosovo, Serbian failure to comply with EU, NATO, UN, and 
OSCE recommendations, sanctions, diplomatic agreements, and ceasefires made resorting to 
force the logical conclusion to the failed diplomacy.
149
 
 The opponent in Kosovo had a great impact on the motivations, justifications, and 
conduct of the intervention in Kosovo with national security and national interest implications. 
The problem of Milosevic and his aggressive nature meant that, as Pickering said in March 1999, 
"in order to pursue our interests, we have had to ratchet up more quickly from traditional 
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diplomacy to diplomacy backed by a credible threat of force or the actual use of force. For a 
threat of force to be effective, it must be credible. It must be clear that the U.S. and its partners 
are willing to use force in these kinds of specific cases to achieve key objectives should 
diplomacy fail."
150
 Milosevic's actions convinced Western leaders that if they did not act now 
then the conflict would escalate which was one of the main national interest reasons for 
intervening in Kosovo. 
 Pickering's remarks emphasize the threat Milosevic presented and the need to project 
strong opposition to him when he said that Milosevic "[broke] the norms of acceptable behavior, 
use[d] force against [his] own people and others, and then challenge[d] the rest of us to stop 
[him]. The silent fact of our unity and power ha[d] proven to be an insufficient deterrent; only 
the credible threat of the use of power or indeed its use ha[d] stopped [him]."
151
 Milosevic was a 
threat to US national interests in a stable Europe and therefore the country needed to deal with 
the situation in Kosovo. 
 While the United States may have felt the need to get involved in the Kosovo situation 
for moral and security reasons, the personality of their opponent, Slobodan Milosevic, helped to 
push that involvement to military intervention. Richard Miles recalls two episodes which clearly 
exemplify Milosevic's strong, stubborn personality and his reluctance to accept other's opinions 
on his country or that he was wrong. During the Bosnian war from 1992 to 1995, many Western 
countries including the U.S. withdrew the ambassador rank from their diplomatic delegations to 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and dropped the level of representation down to what the 
U.S. calls Chief of Mission. After the Bosnian war ended, most of the other countries reinstated 
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their ambassador rank, but the United States did not. So, even though Richard Miles had been an 
ambassador to other countries previously, in 1996, he was appointed as Chief of Mission to 
Belgrade. Miles recalls his first meeting with Milosevic in 1996. Milosevic asked Miles if in the 
US you can lose the title of "ambassador" once you have already been an ambassador. Miles said 
no, but that he was not carrying the title of ambassador to Serbia but was the Chief of Mission. 
Milosevic asked if he could call Miles "ambassador" and Miles said that in person he can call 
him whatever he likes, "but in print I would prefer to be called Chief of Mission." Milosevic said 
he was going to call Miles "ambassador" and when Miles replied that he was not the ambassador, 
he was the Chief of Mission, Milosevic just replied that he was going to call him "ambassador". 
From then on, after a meeting between the two, the newspapers would write that Milosevic had 
met with "Chief of Mission, Ambassador Miles". Milosevic's stubbornness over something as 
simple as a name clearly exemplifies his strong personality and dislike of relenting to other's 
authority.
152
 
 Miles recalls a second incident which also shows Milosevic's personality and its effects. 
As Miles said it, Milosevic had  "moxy, a sense of humor" but that he "didn't like people telling 
him no." A couple of years before the bombing, Milosevic and Miles had had an argument over 
dinner about the price of eggs. Milosevic had been trying to convince Miles that despite Western 
support for Bosnia, the price of eggs in the markets of Sarajevo was higher than those in 
Belgrade. However, Miles and his wife would go on regular trips to the market to go shopping 
and take a look at the prices, so Miles knew that the price Milosevic stated was wrong. When 
Miles told him that, Milosevic continued replying in a joking manner but with serious 
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undertones, "you [think] you know more about the price of eggs in my country than I know." 
Milosevic did not like that Miles seemed to undermine him.
153
 
 This minor conversation was never forgotten, and Miles believed that it always annoyed 
Milosevic that Miles had proved him wrong and thought he knew more about current situation in 
Serbia. Years later, at dinner, the night before the bombing began, Milosevic brought this topic 
up in a conversation with Holbrooke and Miles "in a joking way, complaining about the fact that 
[Miles] thought he knew more about his country than he did."
154
 So there they were, the 
diplomatic representatives of the United States having dinner with the President of FRY, after 
Milosevic had rejected the West's ultimatum at Rambouillet, attempting once last conversation 
between the two countries, and Milosevic is bringing up a distant memory, a conversation about 
the price of eggs, in which Miles had showed him up and proved him wrong about his own 
country. One would think that Milosevic would have more on his mind knowing that his country 
was about to be bombed than a two year old argument about the price of eggs. 
 Milosevic's stubborn and aggressive personality made it unlikely for him to back down in 
the face of Western diplomatic pressure. He did not like to be told how to run his country and 
therefore negotiations, especially the ultimatum given to him at Rambouillet, failed. The failure 
of negotiations forced the United States and NATO to resort to military force in order to back up 
their diplomacy and serve US national interests in maintaining a stable, peaceful Europe.  
 The resort to force in humanitarian crises is a hotly debated issue, both at the time of 
Kosovo and still today. In the case of Kosovo, its location in Europe made it a second level 
concern to US national interests (rather than a third level concern as most humanitarian crises 
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are) which helped US policymakers justify and believe in their decision to participate in, and 
lead, the NATO intervention in 1999. When humanitarian crises arise, the level of concern for 
US national interests as a whole, beyond the broad humanitarian goals of US policy, influence 
the decision to commit US troops. In Kosovo, broader concerns of European stability added to 
the ethical concerns put forth in chapter one to make a military solution seem like the right 
course of action to US policymakers. 
 However, while this is the belief and justification put forth by US policymakers, is this 
belief the correct one? Should intervention only occur when "more important" national security 
political and economic issues are at stake? Or can and should humanitarian concerns on their 
own be an important enough issue to justify US intervention, either diplomatic, economic, or 
political? Or should humanitarian issues outside the US's vital national interests be left up to 
international organizations (a topic that will be addressed in chapter 3)? These are all heavily 
debated questions as humanitarian issues are very difficult for policymakers to ignore given, as 
highlighted in chapter one, the high profile nature of them in the press which can arouse 
sympathy and a call for action from those across the world. While these ethical concerns can be 
justified, is a military solution to these problems the correct path? The US policymakers take a 
pragmatic approach to the issue by prioritizing those crises that have a stronger connection to US 
national interests, usually either political or economic. This connection of a humanitarian issue to 
national security interests makes the risks and expense worth it to the United States. While this 
might not be the most fair solution to those suffering in countries of little importance to the US, 
it does keep the US from completely depleting its resources and public morale by intervening in 
every conflict that arises while still helping some people, though as addressed in chapter one 
sometimes a military solution does not always benefit the victims immediately.  
51 
 The balance between pragmatic national security concerns and ethical issues put forth by 
Clinton in "A National Security Strategy for a New Century" exemplifies this problem and tries 
to prioritize traditional national security concerns with a rising humanitarian eye to an 
increasingly globalized world. While the ends do not justify the means and the intervention in 
Kosovo is still considered controversial by many, in retrospect, the relative stability in the region 
and the recent agreement in April 2013 between Serbian and Kosovar leaders to normalize 
relations between the two and to not block the others progress towards joining the EU makes the 
intervention, with its justification on reasons of European stability, seem to have succeeded.
155
  
 Clinton said that "America cannot be everywhere or do everything overseas, but we must 
act where important interests are at stake and we can make a difference."
156
 It would be 
impossible and financially unrealistic for the United States to try and address every humanitarian 
issue in the entire world, but sometimes national security interests combined with humanitarian 
issues a justify US intervention. It is a security concern for the United States to let humanitarian 
crises continue and spread and, as Clinton summarizes, when US "we must remember that the 
real challenge of foreign policy is to deal with problems before they harm our national 
interests."
157
 Humanitarian crises can expand and threaten US national interests, as the situation 
in Kosovo did. The crisis in Kosovo and the resulting humanitarian intervention had national 
security and national interests justifications for geopolitical reasons. The European Union, and 
Europe as a whole, is one of the United States' most important and closest allies and partners in 
the international community. Therefore it is important to US national interests to maintain and 
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help create a Europe "whole, free, and at peace." The intervention in Kosovo served US national 
interests to prevent the spread of conflict in Europe and help bring about this objective. 
  
53 
CHAPTER 3: 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
 
 The 1999 military intervention in Kosovo was not a unilateral intervention by the United 
States, instead it was conducted under the auspices of NATO.  Humanitarian intervention has 
continually been a controversial subject in international organizations. In Kosovo, the United 
Nations' indecision allowed the intervention, unlike major past interventions, to be conducted 
and led by NATO, rather than with UN approval and in conjunction with (or led by) UN 
peacekeeping forces. Divides in the UN Security Council allowed NATO to take charge and 
gave the intervention in Kosovo the opportunity to help NATO find its purpose in the post-Cold 
War world. 
The United Nations in the Kosovo Crisis 
 While there was no specific UN resolution either supporting or rejecting the use of 
NATO force in Kosovo, UN resolutions were used to bolster NATO's cause. The first UN 
Security Council resolution on the situation in Kosovo was Security Council Resolution 1160 
released on March 31, 1998. It condemned the actions of both sides of the conflict, notably the 
"excessive use of force by Serbian police forces against civilians and peaceful demonstrators in 
Kosovo", called for peaceful dialogue to resolve the situation, and banned arm sales to both 
sides' leadership (which included the government of Yugoslavia).
 158
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 When hostilities only increased in the following months, the Security Council introduced 
Resolution 1199 on September 23, 1998 due to its concerns with the "recent intense fighting in 
Kosovo and in particular the excessive and indiscriminate use of force by Serbian security forces 
and the Yugoslav Army,...[concern about] the flow of refugees into northern Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and other European countries as a result of the use of force in Kosovo, as well as 
by the increasing numbers of displaced persons within Kosovo."
159
 The resolution indicated 
"alarm at the impending humanitarian catastrophe... and emphasiz[ed] the need to prevent this 
from happening," and therefore demanded a ceasefire, "the withdrawal of security units used for 
civilian repression,... the safe return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes, and...free 
and unimpeded access for humanitarian organizations and supplies to Kosovo."
160
 The resolution 
highlighted "the commitments of the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in his joint 
statement with the President of the Russian Federation of 16 June 1998...to resolve existing 
problems by political means on the basis of equality for all citizens and ethnic communities in 
Kosovo [and] not carry out any repressive actions against the peaceful population."
161
 Finally, 
the resolution "decide[d] [that], should the concrete measures demanded in this resolution and 
Resolution 1160 (1998) not be taken, to consider further action and additional measures to 
maintain or restore peace and stability in the region."
162
 
 The final Security Council Resolution related to the situation in Kosovo before the 
conclusion of the NATO bombing campaign was Resolution 1203 put forth on October 24, 1998 
which re-emphasized the points made in the previous two resolutions and Serbian failure to 
comply. The resolution affirmed an agreement made on October 15, 1998 in which Milosevic 
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agreed "to cease hostilities and withdraw mobilized forces in Kosovo" and to comply with the 
terms of UNSC Resolution 1199.
 163
 Milosevic had furthered agreed that unarmed NATO flights 
(NATO's "Air Verification Mission", Operation Eagle Eye) and an OSCE (Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe) Kosovo Verification Mission on the ground were to ensure 
compliance to these terms.
 164
 
 After Resolution 1203, there were no more UN Resolutions related to the Kosovo conflict 
and any intervention in Kosovo until after the cessation of hostilities in June 1999. 
Disagreements between Western leaders (especially the US and UK) and Russia prevented any 
sort of resolution to be made in support of intervention. This divide followed from the 
discussions surrounding Resolutions 1199 and 1203 in the Security Council in which "immediate 
diplomatic action to end the conflict" was called for as well as "a cessation of all military action 
in the region, but, at the insistence of China and Russia, did not authorize military action if these 
conditions were not met."
165
 Furthermore, on March 26, 1999, Belarus, India, and Russia 
submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council which demanded an "immediate cessation" 
of (NATO's) use of force "against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the urgent resumption 
of negotiations" which failed (as should be expected considering that both the US and UK are 
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permanent members of the Security Council and two of the leading countries in NATO) by a 
vote of twelve to three.
 166
 
 There was no attempt beyond these resolutions to get Security Council approval for 
NATO's actions in Kosovo as any attempt to secure support for military action was expected to 
fail through (at least) the veto of Russia. One primary argument in favor of this course was that if 
NATO action had been officially vetoed by the UN it would have been difficult to gain both 
political and public support for military action in the wake of this denial.
167
 However, UN 
Resolutions 1199 and 1203 could be used to provide legal basis for military action given that 
UNSC 1199 indicated that "further action" would be taken if demands for peace were not met 
and UNSC 1203 "accepted that the Alliance [NATO] had a direct standing and interest in the 
Kosovo issue."
168
 
 As is evident from the disagreements within the Security Council regarding the crisis in 
Kosovo, the United Nations is limited when it comes to organizing and directing humanitarian 
interventions. These difficulties arise from such a large organization whose decision-making 
body (when it comes to action) is made up of a set of countries with diverse interests and beliefs, 
five of whom have a veto to any resolution which could approve or halt action. Though the 
Security Council was unable to reach any resolution supporting or rejecting NATO action in 
Kosovo, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan implicitly aided NATO's cause through subtle 
supporting statements and no explicit denouncement of NATO's actions. It was the report of 
Annan to the Security Council which led to the inclusion in UNSC Resolution 1199 the need to 
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prevent the "impending humanitarian catastrophe" from happening.
169
 In an address to the 
General Assembly of the UN on September 21, 1998, "Annan pointed to the need for action in 
Kosovo where 'the international community seems to be watching impotently while the kind of 
brutal and indiscriminate abuses we saw in Bosnia are repeated, something we all swore must 
never happen again.'"
170
 Through his statements Annan highlighted a need for action before it a 
worse humanitarian disaster began, and the disgrace of the international community's failure to 
act so far. 
 Annan continually "walked a fine line" between support for NATO action and the 
predominance of the UN. While Annan "stress[ed] that NATO engagement without a UN 
mandate 'would set a dangerous precedent,' ...[and continued to] reaffirm the right of national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, Annan's reports to the Security Council following the 
passage of the resolution stressed his continuing preference for meaningful action to be taken due 
to the gravity of the violence and humanitarian crisis taking place."
171
 On March 24, 1999, after 
the initiation of the NATO bombing, Annan released a statement that stated "under the [UN] 
Charter the Security Council has primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and 
security...[and] [t]herefore, the Council should be involved in any decision to resort to the use of 
force," which supports the UN line, however Annan also stated that "[i]n helping maintain 
international peace and security, Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter assigns an important 
role to regional organizations...[and] [i]t is indeed tragic that diplomacy has failed, but there are 
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times when the use of force may be legitimate in the pursuit of peace."
 172
 In his press release, 
Annan implicitly seems to support NATO action in Kosovo upon its initiation. Hendrickson and 
Kille conclude that "[t]hrough[out] this statement, Annan clearly defended the Charter and 
institutional interests of the Security Council, yet he balanced this view with his support for 
military action and thus implicit approval for NATO's actions."
173
 Throughout NATO's 
campaign, Annan continued to walk this line between primacy of the UN and support for 
NATO's actions.
174
 
 In their analysis of the importance of Secretary-Generals in cooperation between the UN 
and NATO, Hendrickson and Kille note that "[i]n the months prior to Operation Allied Force, 
Annan also never expressed outright opposition to NATO's movement toward military action, 
which provided tacit approval for NATO's coercive diplomatic-military tactics. In addition, 
Annan met with the NAC [North Atlantic Council of NATO] to lend his support to NATO's 
efforts, which has been viewed as being symbolically important in providing additional political 
legitimacy for NATO's actions."
175
 Though the Security Council provided no resolution in 
support of NATO's actions, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's implicit support for military 
action and lack of explicit disapproval of said action helped reinforce NATO's position. Overall 
UN indecision and inhibitions to action gave NATO the opportunity to take up a new position in 
international intervention with its actions in Kosovo. 
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NATO in the Kosovo Crisis 
 As addressed in Chapter 2, helping to fulfill and follow NATO's goals in Kosovo is an 
important facet of US foreign policy and humanitarian intervention in US foreign policy. 
However, the intervention in Kosovo also performed another important function related to 
NATO, it helped NATO find its purpose and place in the post-Cold War world. 
 NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, was formed in response to the conditions 
of the Cold War in Europe, in order to sustain and build the alliance between the major Western 
countries, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and West Germany, and to protect 
against any perceived current or future threat of Soviet aggression and communist expansion. 
With the fall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and Russia, aside from contributing to 
the violent break-up of Yugoslavia which spurred the very ethnic wars this project is concerned 
with, NATO lost the basic purpose for which it was founded. While NATO worked to create and 
pursue new goals in this new environment, some of which were elaborated in chapter 2 in 
relation of the pursuit of a free and united Europe, there was no longer a strategic necessity for 
the continuation of the organization. As the United States' primary security alliance and direct 
connection to its European allies, it was not in the United States' best interests to let NATO fall 
apart even though the Cold War had ended. From this standpoint, the crisis in Kosovo and the 
international response to it provided an opportunity for NATO to find a new place and purpose in 
the post-Cold War world and to help push it forward into the next century. 
 Aside from giving NATO a purpose for both continued existence and action, inaction by 
NATO was seen as unacceptable. In multiple speeches Clinton used the phrase "discredit 
NATO" in reference to the organization not acting to stop the crisis in Kosovo. This phrase was 
60 
used in two different contexts. First, on the initiation of the bombing, Clinton said, "Imagine 
what would happen if we and our allies instead decided just to look the other way, as these 
people were massacred on NATO's doorstep. That would discredit NATO, the cornerstone on 
which our security has rested for 50 years now."
176
 In this case, non-intervention would discredit 
NATO and rock the foundations of US national security policy. Second, on May 23, 1999, 
Clinton stated, "NATO itself would have been discredited for failing to defend the very values 
that give it meaning."
177
 Inaction would also discredit NATO by showing its inability to pursue 
and defend its goals and values. 
 In the same speech from March 24, 1999, Clinton also says, "Our mission is clear: to 
demonstrate the seriousness of NATO's purpose so that the Serbian leaders understand the 
imperative of reversing course."
178
 While Clinton uses the term "purpose" in this context to 
demonstrate NATO's continuing drive and fortitude, the use of the word also reminds the public 
of this same main point, that one of NATO's new goals and purposes in the post-Cold War world 
was to protect civilians against ethnic cleansing and extend NATO's values to the recently 
"freed" citizens of Eastern Europe. 
 Articulating and promoting a new purpose for NATO in the post-Cold War world was 
especially important given the context of the crisis and intervention in Kosovo. After the fall of 
the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the establishment of democracies in these 
countries, these fledgling democracies set out on the path to join NATO and the EU. With the 
first of these countries, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland officially joining NATO on 
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March 13, 1999 (less than two weeks before the bombing began), the timing was crucial.
179
 1999 
was also the 50th anniversary of NATO's founding, and a summit in Washington DC was 
planned in April 1999 to commemorate this anniversary. According to Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright, "the summit was planned to celebrate NATO's 50 years of unity and look 
forward to the new century, and we will mark that success and confirm our readiness to face the 
future with new members and new capabilities prepared for new missions."
180
 A clear purpose, 
with goals and a field for action for the organization was especially important in this 
environment, and the intervention in Kosovo gave that to NATO. As Albright said just before the 
conference, "In Kosovo, we are responding to a post-Cold War threat to Alliance interests and 
values. The crisis has demonstrated the need for precisely the kind of adaptations the Alliance 
has initiated and will take to the summit level this weekend."
181
 The crisis re-affirmed the 
position of NATO in the post-Cold War world and helped promote the "adaptations" that the 
organization hoped to project in the anniversary summit. 
 In a press conference on the second day of the summit, President Clinton said, "For five 
years now, we have been working to build a new NATO prepared to deal with the security 
challenges of the new century," and as the primary topic of the conference was the war in 
Kosovo, it was clear what the direction this new NATO was going to take.
182
 Clinton's National 
Security Advisor, Sandy Berger, said  
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 "perhaps most importantly, from the very beginning we have wanted the summit to make 
 a clear statement of NATO's values and vision for Europe. I cannot imagine a more 
 powerful statement of what our Alliance stands for than the actions it is taking in Kosovo 
 today, or a more powerful demonstration of its unity and resolve in the face of new 
 challenges. That does not make the situation in Kosovo less tragic or difficult, but it does 
 offer hope that this Alliance will continue to do what it has done so well for the last 50 
 years -- to uphold our interests and our values by making clear that America and Europe 
 will do what it takes to defend them."
183
  
The situation in Kosovo gave a clear purpose for NATO coming into the new century which 
combined well with both maintaining and upholding US national interests and expanding 
security and stability further into Eastern Europe which Berger elaborated on when he said, 
"Kosovo reminds us as well that NATO must play the same stabilizing role in Central and 
Southeastern Europe that it played in Western Europe, and more recently in Central Europe by 
integrating new democracies, giving them incentive to resolve their tensions peacefully and 
encouraging them to pool their strength instead of pitting it against their neighbors or their own 
people."
184
 Kosovo was a clear example of NATO expanding its field of vision further to the 
East and into more violent, volatile, and convoluted ethnic conflicts outside of NATO's current 
territory. 
 The discussions at the summit formulated a new strategic concept for the alliance which 
was based, in part, on the situation in Kosovo. The crisis reminded the alliance leaders, as 
Madeleine Albright said that, "[e]ven as we respond to this crisis in Kosovo, we must concern 
ourselves more broadly with the future of the region. Our explicit goal should be to transform the 
Balkans from Europe's primary source of instability into an important part of its mainstream, and 
we must work to ensure that NATO forces will not again be called on to fight terror and 
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destruction in this corner of the continent."
185
 This statement links NATO's goals with that of US 
national security interests explained in Chapter 2 on the benefits and vision of a peaceful, stable 
European partner.  
 The purpose of NATO's strategic concept is to "govern the Alliance's security and 
defence policy, its operational concepts, its conventional and nuclear force posture and its 
collective defence arrangements," and the Strategic Concept "will be kept under review in the 
light of the evolving security environment."
186
 Therefore, the goals of NATO laid out in the 
document should guide NATO policy and action. This is important given that one of NATO's 
primary purposes was (and had been) to "safeguard common security interests in an environment 
of further, often unpredictable change."
187
 While that had been true since its founding during the 
Cold War, the direction and content of these "common security interests" had changed. These 
interests now included violent ethnic conflicts along the borders of NATO's territory rather than 
just that contained within its boundaries. The new Strategic Concept formulated and approved 
during the anniversary summit dictated as one of the primary purposes of the alliance: "to secure 
a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe...[b]ased on common values of democracy, human 
rights and the rule of law."
188
 Furthermore "[t]he achievement of this aim can be put at risk by 
crisis and conflict affecting the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance therefore not 
only ensure the defence of its members but contributes to peace and stability in the region."
189
 
This statement made clear that peace beyond the borders of NATO was a goal of the alliance. 
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 Within this field of action, the new document officially permitted out-of-area action for 
NATO, a statement which included and perhaps was spurred by the air campaign in 
Yugoslavia.
190
 Unlike in the earlier versions, "Alliance leaders dropped from the new strategic 
concept a 1991 statement that NATO is 'purely defensive in purpose: none of its weapons will 
ever be used except in self-defense.'"
191
 Instead, the document states, "[m]ilitary capabilities 
effective under the full range of foreseeable circumstances are also the basis of the Alliance's 
ability to contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management through non-Article 5 crisis 
response operations."
192
 In this case, not only are out-of-area operations permitted, but the 
alliance's military capabilities were now the foundation of NATO's ability to assist in security-
threatening situations, even those that did not involve a direct attack on one of the members 
(Article 5 of NATO's charter).  
 While the new Strategic Concept "included a focus on strengthening partnerships, [it] did 
not emphasize the UN."
193
 Within this frame, while the strategic concept does identify the UN 
Security Council as having "the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security," it does "not tie alliance action to Security Council endorsement," an important and 
relatively new concept which will be addressed later in this chapter.
 194
 
 Basically the intervention in Kosovo combined with the timing of the 50th anniversary 
summit helped define NATO's purpose in the post-Cold War world and allowed this new 
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"strategic concept" for NATO to be born. The new strategic concept was set out with the 
intention to guide NATO into the new century, and the content of this document was born out of 
the circumstances of the conflict and intervention in Yugoslavia in the 1990s, primarily that in 
Kosovo in 1999. This unprecedented action and intervention without a UN Security Council 
resolution on the edges of a newly expanded NATO (new-initiate Hungary was the only NATO 
member country to border Yugoslavia) helped alliance leaders form the basis and guidelines for 
their future policy. 
 The intervention in Kosovo gave NATO not only a reason for continued existence but a 
field for action, one which would be elaborated within the new strategic concept. NATO's 
conduct in the intervention was part of and signaled a new field for the organization in the post-
Cold War world. The NATO campaign, Operation Allied Force, was the second offensive 
military campaign in the organization's history. Operation Deliberate Force, the name for 
NATO's combat missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, was the first and broke the barrier 
for NATO intervention, but its circumstances were different.
195
 NATO's air campaign in Bosnia 
in 1994-1995 was conducted with UN approval and with the combined efforts of UN 
peacekeeping forces on the ground.
196
 In Bosnia, the UN and NATO worked together, and 
"[p]art of this new coordination [in the post-Cold War world] ... stemmed from the ... 
arrangement established in 1993 for the crisis in Bosnia, which required both UN and NATO 
officials to agree a ground violation had occurred in Bosnia before NATO could take military 
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action in response to the agreed upon violation."
197
 UN Security Council Resolution 836 
(6/4/1993) stated that "[m]ember States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or 
arrangements, may take, under the authority of the Security Council and subject to close 
coordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, all necessary measures, through the 
use of air power, in and around the safe areas in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to 
support UNPROFOR."
198
 In February 1994, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
informed the Security Council that he had requested that NATO authorize air strikes against 
artillery and mortar positions near Sarajevo.
199
 Unlike the action in Bosnia, NATO's campaign in 
Kosovo was conducted with neither UN Security Council sanction nor request. 
 One new position for NATO in Kosovo was that the air campaign was conducted without 
any UN sanction or explicit approval. This was a new field for NATO that was later expressed in 
its new strategic concept. There was initial disagreement within NATO leaders regarding this 
lack of UN support because while some, like Tony Blair, "wanted a very aggressive entry into 
Kosovo" others, such as President Clinton and the French leaders, wanted "a permissive entry 
into Kosovo, that is there would be some kind of diplomatic agreement in place that would allow 
NATO forces to enter at will as contrasted to using military force to enter."
 200
 From this debate, 
once NATO decided to take military action, the "NATO air campaign was new ground when it 
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was inducted in 1999."
201
 This "new ground" for NATO was soon related into NATO's new 
Strategic Concept which did not explicitly state that UN approval was necessary for NATO to 
take action. The circumstances of the intervention in Kosovo gave NATO this new position and 
purpose that it was searching for in the post-Cold War world. 
 There was another new realm introduced in NATO with the intervention in Kosovo: the 
possibility of using ground troops in an offensive capacity under NATO command, similar to the 
air campaign just with ground forces. While NATO ground troops did not enter into Kosovo 
until June 12, 1999 which was after the agreement with Milosevic to withdraw Serb forces from 
Kosovo was signed and UN Resolution 1244 was implemented, and therefore were then only 
involved as a peacekeeping force rather than in combat, there was discussion within NATO 
about sending ground troops into Kosovo to aid the air campaign throughout its duration.
 202
  
 Soon after the air campaign began, the White House denied that combat ground troops 
would be used in Kosovo when White House Press Secretary Joe Lockhart said, "We will not use 
ground troops in anything but a permissive environment."
203
 However, by the anniversary 
summit in late April 1999, the issue of ground troops was still being debated.
204
As a Washington 
Post article stated on April 23, 1999, "Administration officials maintain[ed]...that ground troops 
will not be necessary because airstrikes eventually will force a troop withdrawal by Yugoslav 
President Slobodan Milosevic," however, as US Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, "told a 
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House subcommittee, 'In the event that it is not, in the future, that's a decision we'll have to make 
at that time.'"
205
 British Foreign Minister Robin Cook and French President Jacques Chirac also 
made subtle comments indicating that the ground troop issue was still on the table if it was to 
become necessary, when they said, respectively, that "it is possible to 'conceive of circumstances 
in which it may be feasible to commit ground troops,'" and that "the alliance should apply 
'additional means' besides escalating the air war to stop 'massacres, rapes, burned villages, 
families separated and thrown onto the roads,'" in the week leading up to the NATO summit.
206
 
While the US did not refer explicitly to ground troops in this context, both Madeleine Albright 
and Joe Lockhart (speaking for the White House) stated in some words that it was important to 
continually update the assessments and plans relative to the progress of the situation.
207
  
 NATO was limited in its discussions and ability to use ground troops because of the fact 
that since "everybody has to agree...NATO is a particularly cautious and bureaucratic 
organization."
208
 However, the discussions of ground troops and an increasing number of news 
articles about troop training and deployments to areas on the borders of Kosovo continued 
throughout the air campaign.
209
 These discussions, and therefore, the increasing possibility of a 
ground campaign, are suspected to be one reason regarding the timing of Milosevic's acceptance 
of a peace plan on June 3, 1999 which ended the 78 day air campaign.
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 While combat ground 
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troops were not sent into Kosovo during NATO's campaign, the discussion of their use was new 
territory for NATO made possible by the situation in Kosovo. 
 When looking at the intervention in retrospect, Marc Grossman, Assistant Secretary of 
State for European Affairs, discussed this point explicitly when he stated the three primary 
reasons for US involvement in the intervention in Kosovo. In 2013, Grossman said in reference 
to the decisions of 1999, "I thought this coalition of like-minded countries in the NATO alliance 
was an important thing to preserve, and I didn't see how if Kosovo degenerated into some kind of 
mayhem and we didn't intervene in some fashion; I couldn't see what the alliance would be for in 
the future."
211
 The trouble NATO had finding its place in the post-Cold War world, combined 
with the events of 1999, and the 50th anniversary summit make it clear now, years later, that the 
intervention in Kosovo helped give NATO new purpose in an uncertain international position, 
one it was allowed to take because of disagreements in the UN. 
 Within humanitarian intervention policy as a whole, the conflict in Kosovo provided 
NATO with a new opportunity to take the lead in an unprecedented manner. Previously, 
humanitarian intervention had been conducted under UN auspices with the UN acting as a 
supervisory authority, unilaterally, or in a colonial context. However, the conflict in Kosovo 
allowed NATO to take the helm when the UN was unable to come to a unanimous decision 
regarding intervention, and led the organization to take a leadership role in assuming 
responsibility regarding the safety and security of not only NATO member country citizens but 
their neighbors as well. The intervention in Kosovo was a new way for humanitarian intervention 
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to be conducted, and this opportunity gave NATO the new purpose it needed to survive in a 
world no longer dominated by Cold War threats. 
 Though the UN Security Council produced resolutions condemning the actions of both 
the Yugoslav forces and the KLA in Kosovo, it was unable to reach any agreement regarding 
military action or even peacekeeping troops. This indecision allowed NATO to take the helm in 
the intervention in Kosovo which helped give the organization its new purpose in the post-Cold 
War world, a purpose that would then become defined in its new Strategic Concept set forth 
during its 50th anniversary summit in Washington DC in April 1999. As a leading power in 
NATO, the US spurred its involvement in the conflict as intervention gave both justification for 
NATO's continued existence and weight to finding NATO's new purpose in the realm of human 
rights protection within the larger scope of peace and stability in Europe, especially once the UN 
failed to act. In general the circumstances surrounding NATO provided further justification, in 
the eyes of US policymakers, for intervention in Kosovo. 
  
71 
CONCLUSION 
 
 This study has shown that from the perspective of US policymakers, there are three 
primary reasons why the US participated in and led the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999. 
These three reasons are: First, it was a moral necessity based on the atrocities committed by the 
Serbs against the Kosovars. Second, it was in the national security interests of the US; and third, 
due to UN inability to act, these two prior justifications, and NATO's search for a purpose in the 
post-Cold War period, the intervention helped justify NATO's existence and gave it a purpose. 
This argument is important because it shows why humanitarian intervention might be pursued as 
a foreign policy objective of the US and what the conditions are for a "justified", in the eyes of 
policymakers, intervention, an understanding that is important to have when analyzing US 
foreign policy and questions regarding possible future interventions. 
 Since the intervention in Kosovo, other situations have arisen in which the language of 
humanitarian intervention has been used by policymakers in regards to the decision to take 
military action. The most recent example is the case in Syria. Following evidence of a chemical 
weapons attack by the Syrian regime on civilians in the current civil war raging in the country, 
parallels were drawn to the Kosovo conflict. An article headlined "Air War in Kosovo Seen as 
Precedent in Possible Response to Syria Chemical Attack" in the New York Times concluded that 
US President Obama's administration was looking to the intervention in Kosovo as "a possible 
blueprint for acting without a mandate from the United Nations" for a possible intervention in 
72 
Syria.
212
 According to the article, the similarities were there, attacks against civilians and the 
unlikelihood of UN sanction given Russian ties to the Syrian (or Serbian in the case of Kosovo) 
government.  
 On the other hand, a opinion piece was also published in the New York Times by James P. 
Rubin, who in 1999 was Chief Spokesman for the State Department and a close advisor of 
Madeleine Albright, which argued against intervention in Syria based on these same 
justifications. He shows how the Syrian conflict does not meet the justification requirements that 
Kosovo did, including the importance to US national interests and the approval of an 
international organization, and therefore the legitimacy born out of the campaign conducted by 
an international organization such as NATO.
213
 
 While action was not taken in Syria as of March 2014, and it looks to be unlikely that it 
will, the fact that these connections were drawn highlight the continuing relevance of 
humanitarian intervention and especially the Kosovo conflict in US foreign policy. The case of 
Kosovo is especially useful and interesting in analyzing conflicts in which UN sanction in not 
given because as Rubin notes in his piece on Syria, "History’s verdict on Kosovo has been that it 
was legitimate but not strictly legal."
214
 Human rights violations, especially those involving 
government violence against civilians, continue to raise calls for international action and 
humanitarian intervention. However, military intervention in all foreign conflicts is an 
unrealistic, expensive, and incorrect course of action. By really understanding the justifications 
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for the intervention in Kosovo, it can be used to analyze whether possible future interventions 
will be likely to be conducted and the grounds on which interventions can be acceptably justified 
in the eyes of policymakers and even the public.  
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